

GERMANY THE NEXT REPUBLIC?

BY CARL W. ACKERMAN

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Zimmermann Began to Plan With the General Staff and the Navy to League Mexico Against the United States When He Awakened to the Realization That Germany's Threatening Propaganda in America and Her Plots Against This Country's Property Were Not Frightening Uncle Sam Away From War

Colonel House Tried Hard, When He Arrived in Berlin in 1916, to Impress the German Officials With the Fact That President Wilson Was Not Only Not Bluffing, but That the American People Would Support Him in Whatever He Did in Dealing With the German Government

WHEN Zimmermann began to realize that Germany's threatening propaganda in the United States and Germany's plots against American property were not succeeding in frightening the United States away from war, he began to look forward to the event of war. He saw, as most Germans did, that it would be a long time before the United States could get forces to Europe in a sufficient number to have a decisive effect upon the war. He began to plan with the General Staff and the navy to league Mexico against America for two purposes. One, Germany figured at a war with Mexico would keep the United States army and navy busy over here. Further, Zimmermann often said to callers that if the United States went to war with Mexico it would not be possible for American factories to send so much ammunition and so many supplies to the Allies.

German eyes turned to Mexico. As soon as President Wilson recognized Carranza as President Germany followed with a formal recognition. Zubaran Capmany, who had been Mexican representative in Washington, was sent to Berlin as Carranza's Minister. Immediately upon his arrival Zimmermann began negotiations with him. Reports of the negotiations were sent to Washington. The State Department was warned that unless the United States solved the "Mexican problem" immediately Germany would prepare to attack us through Mexico. German reservists were tipped off to be ready to go to Mexico upon a moment's notice. Count von Bernstorff and the German consuls in the United States were instructed, and Bernstorff, who was acting as the general director of German interests in North and South America, was told to inform the German officials in the Latin-American countries. At the same time, German financial interests began to purchase banks, farms and mines in Mexico.

Von Jagow at Heart a Pacifist

After the sinking of the Arabic the German Foreign Office intimated to the United States Government and to the American correspondents that methods of submarine warfare would be altered and that ships would be warned before they were torpedoed. But when the navy heard that the Foreign Office was inclined to listen to Mr. Wilson's protests it made no attempt to conceal its opposition. Gottlieb von Jagow, the Secretary of State, although he was an intimate friend of the Kaiser and an officer in the German army, was at heart a pacifist. Every time an opportunity presented itself he tried to mobilize the peace forces of the world to make peace. From time to time the German financiers and propaganda leaders in the United States, as well as influential Germans in the neutral European countries, sent out peace "feelers." Von Jagow realized that the sooner peace was made the better it would be for Germany and the easier it would be for the Foreign Office to defeat the military party at home. He saw that the more victories the army had and the more victories it could announce to the people the more lustful the General Staff would be for a war of exhaustion.

Army leaders have always had more confidence in their ability to defeat the world than the Foreign Office. The army looked at the map of Europe and saw so many hundred thou-



*von Hindenburg
Generaloberst*

This is the picture of Von Hindenburg which is found in nearly every German home.

sand square miles of territory under occupation. The Foreign Office saw Germany in its relation to the world. Von Jagow knew that every new square mile of territory gained was being paid for, not only by the cost of German blood, but by the more terrible cost of public opinion and German influence abroad. But Germany was under martial law, and the Foreign Office had nothing to say about military plans.

The Foreign Office also had little to say about naval warfare. The navy was building submarines as fast as it could, and the number of ships lost encouraged the people to believe that the more intensified the submarine war became the quicker the war would end in Germany's favor. So the navy kept sinking ships and relying upon the Foreign Office to make excuses and keep America out of the war.

The repeated violations of the pledges made by the Foreign Office to the United States aroused American public opinion to white heat, and justly so, because the people here did not understand that the real submarine crisis was not between President Wilson and Berlin, but between Admiral von Tirpitz and Secretary von Jagow and their followers.

President Wilson was at the limit of his patience with Germany, and the German people, who were becoming impatient over the long-drawn-out proceedings, began to accept the inspired thinking of the navy and to believe that Wilson was working for the defeat of Germany by interfering with submarine activities.

On February 22, 1916, in one of my dispatches I said: "The patient attitude toward America displayed during the Lusitania negotiations, it is plain today, no longer exists, because of the popular feeling that America has already hindered so many of Germany's plans." At that time it appeared to observers in Berlin that unless President Wilson could show more patience than the German Government the next submarine accident would bring about

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a break in relations. Commenting on this dispatch, the Indianapolis News the next day said:

"In this country the people feel that all the patience has been shown by their Government. We believe that history will sustain that view. Almost ten months ago more than one hundred American citizens were deliberately done to death by the German Government, for it is understood that the submarine commander acted under instructions and that Germany refuses to disavow on the ground that the murderous act was the act of the German Government. Yet, after all this time, the Lusitania case is still unsettled. The Administration has with marvelous self-restraint recognized that public opinion in Germany was not normal, and that for that reason it has done everything in its power to smooth the way to a settlement by making it as easy as possible for the Imperial Government to meet our just demands. Indeed, the President has gone so far as to expose himself to severe criticism at home. We believe that he would have been sustained if he had immediately after the sinking of the Lusitania broken off diplomatic relations.

"But he has stood out against public opinion in his own country, waited ten months for an answer and done everything that he could in honor do to soften the feeling here. Yet just on the eve of a settlement that would have been unsatisfactory to many of our people Germany announced the policy that we had condemned as illegal, and that plainly is illegal. The trouble in Berlin is an utter inability to see anything wrong in the attack on the Lusitania or to appreciate the sense of horror that was stirred in this country by it. The idea seems to be that the policy of frightfulness could be extended to the high seas without in any way shocking the American people. Nothing has come from Berlin that indicates any feeling of guilt on the part of the German people or their Government.

"In the United States, on the contrary, the act is regarded as one of the blackest crimes of history. And yet, in spite of that feeling, we have waited patiently for ten months in the hope that the German Government would do justice and clear its name of reproach. Yet now we are told that it is Germany that has shown a 'patient attitude,' the implication or insinuation being that our long-suffering Administration has been unreasonable and impatient. That will not be the verdict of history, as it is not the verdict of our own people. We have made every allowance for the conditions existing in Germany and have absolutely refused to take advantage of her distress. We doubt whether there is any other Government in the world that would have shown the patience and moderation under like provocation that have been shown by the American Government in these Lusitania negotiations."


I sent the editorial to Von Jagow, who returned it the next day with the brief comment on one of his calling cards, "With many thanks."

Colonel House at Work in Berlin

About this time Count Reventlow and the other naval writers began to refer to everything President Wilson did as a "bluff." When Colonel E. M. House came to Berlin early in 1916, he tried to impress the officials with the fact that Mr. Wilson was not only not bluffing, but that the American people would support him in whatever he did in dealing with the German Government. Mr. Gerard tried, too, to impress the Foreign Office, but because he could only deal with that branch of the Government he could not change the navy's impression, which was that Wilson would never take a definite stand against Germany. On the eighth of February the London Times printed the following dispatch, which I had sent to the United States:

Mr. Gerard has been accused of not being forceful enough in dealing with the Berlin Foreign Office. In Berlin he has been criticized for just the opposite. It has been stated frequently that he was too aggressive. The Ambassador's position was that he must carry out Mr. Wilson's ideas. So he tried for days and weeks to impress officials with the seriousness of the situation. At the critical point in the negotiations various unofficial diplomats began to arrive, and they seriously interfered with negotiations. One of these was a politician who, through his credentials from Mr. Bryan, met many high officials and informed them that President Wilson was writing his notes for "home consumption." Mr. Gerard, however, appealed to Washington to know what was meant by the moves of this American with authority from Mr. Bryan. This was the beginning of the reason for Secretary Bryan's resigning.

Secretary Bryan had informed also former Ambassador Dumba that the United States would never take any position against Germany even though it was hinted so in the Lusitania note. Dumba telegraphed this to Vienna, and Berlin was informed immediately.



SECRETARY OF STATE VON JAGOW

Whose opinions were so favorable to the United States that they could not be printed in Germany.

Because of Mr. Gerard's personal friendship and personal association with Secretary of State von Jagow and Under Secretary of State Zimmermann, he was acquainted with Secretary Bryan's move. He telegraphed to President Wilson, and the result was the resignation of Mr. Bryan.

In December the Ancona was torpedoed, and it was officially explained that the act was that of an Austrian submarine commander. Wilson's note to Vienna brought about a near rupture between Austria-Hungary and Germany, because Austria and Hungary at that time were much opposed to Germany's submarine methods. Although the submarines operating in the Mediterranean were flying the Austrian flag, they were German submarines, and members of the crews were German. Throughout the life of the Emperor Franz Josef the Dual Monarchy was ruled, not from Vienna, but from Budapest by Count Stefan Tisza, the Hungarian Premier. I was in Budapest at the time, and one evening saw Count Tisza at his palace, which stands on the rocky cliff opposite the main part of Budapest and which overlooks the valley of the Danube for many miles. Tisza, as well as all Hungarians, is pro-American before he is pro-German.

"To think of trouble between Austria-Hungary and the United States is sheer nonsense," he said in his quiet but forceful manner. "I must confess, however, that we were greatly surprised to get the American note. It is far from our intention to get into any quarrel with America. Perhaps I should not say quarrel, because I know it would not be that; but, of course, matters do not depend upon us entirely. There is no reason for any trouble over the Ancona question. It must be settled satisfactorily," he said emphatically, "not only from the standpoint of the United States, but from our standpoint."

(CONTINUED TOMORROW)

BANQUET TO JAPANESE MISSION GIVEN BY CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AT THE BELLEVUE-STRATFORD

